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Would a Privatized Social Security System Really Pay a Higher Rate of Return?

Abstract
Many advocates of social security privatization argue that rates of return under a
defined contribution individual account system would be much higher for all than they
are under the current social security system. This claim is false. The mistake comes
from ignoring accrued benefits already promised based on past payroll taxes, and from
underestimating the riskiness of stock investments.
Confusion arises because three distinct reforms are muddled. By privatization
we mean creating individual accounts (which could, for example, be invested
exclusively in bonds). By diversification we mean investing in stocks, and perhaps
other assets, as well as bonds; diversification might be undertaken either by individuals
in their private social security accounts, or by the social security trust fund. By
prefunding we mean closing the gap between social security benefits promised to date
and the assets on hand to pay for them. Any one of these reforms could be
implemented without the other two.
If the system were completely privatized, with no prefunding or diversification,
the social security system would need to raise taxes and/or issue new debt in order to
pay benefits already accrued. If the burden were spread evenly across all future
generations via a constant proportional tax, the added taxes would completely
eliminate any rate of return advantage on the individual accounts. We estimate that the
required new taxes would amount to about 3 percent of payroll, or about a quarter of all
social security contributions, in perpetuity. Unlike privatization, prefunding would raise
rates of return for later generations, but at the cost of lower returns for today’s workers.
For households able to invest in the stock market on their own, diversification
would not raise rates of return, correctly adjusted to recognize risk. Households that
are constrained from holding stock, due to lack of wealth outside of social security or to
fixed costs from holding stocks, would gain higher risk-adjusted returns and would
benefit from diversification. If this group is large, diversification would raise stock
values, thus helping current stockholders, but it would lower future stock returns, thus
hurting young unconstrained households. Overall, since the number of truly
constrained households is probably not that large, privatization and diversification
would have a much smaller effect on returns than reformers typically claim.

John Geanakoplos

Olivia S. Mitchell

Stephen P. Zeldes

Cowles Foundation
Yale University
30 Hillhouse Avenue
New Haven, CT 06520
203-432-3397
john.geanakoplos@yale.edu

The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6218
215-898-0424
mitchelo@wharton.upenn.edu

Graduate School of Business
Columbia University
3022 Broadway, Uris 605B
New York, NY 10027-6902
212-854-2492
stephen.zeldes@columbia.edu

As the U.S. Social Security system has matured, the rate of return received by
participants has fallen. In the coming years, around the time the Baby Boom generation
retires, the system will experience a budget shortfall. Tax revenues will fall short of
promised benefits, requiring outlays from the interest earnings, and then the principal,
of the trust fund. Eventually, the trust fund will be depleted. This projected insolvency
will necessitate benefit cuts and/or tax increases, leading to further declines in the
rates of return individuals can expect.
Many advocates of reform suggest that an answer to this problem is to privatize
Social Security. They argue that the creation of individual accounts invested in private
capital markets, and especially in the stock market, will produce better rates of return
for individuals than will Social Security. For example, Stephen Moore of the Cato
Institute recently claimed that “privatization offers a much higher financial rate of return
to young workers than the current system... if Congress were to allow a 25 year old
working woman today to invest her payroll tax contributions in private capital markets,
her retirement benefit would be two to five times higher than what Social Security is
offering”.1 Presidential candidate Steve Forbes criticized Social Security because “the
average worker retiring today receives a lifetime return of only about 2.2 percent on the
taxes he has paid into the system. Contrast this with the historic 9 -10 percent annual
returns from stock market investments... The advantages of an IRA-type approach are
overpowering.” 2
Our goal in this paper is to challenge the following popular argument: a)

1

Moore (1997).

2

Forbes (1996).
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projected returns to Social Security are low relative to expected returns on stocks and
bonds, and therefore b) everyone would receive higher returns and be better off if we
moved to a privatized system where individuals could directly invest their contributions
in stocks and bonds. We argue that for households with access to diversified capital
markets, privatization without prefunding would not increase Social Security returns,
when properly measured. Privatization together with prefunding would eventually raise
the rate of return to future generations of participants, but at the cost of a lower rate of
return to early generations.
The real economic benefit to privatization is the diversification that would be
made available to constrained households that cannot participate on their own in
diversified capital market investment portfolios. The improved rate-of-return argument
in favor of privatization thus has no force unless there are constrained households
without access to diversified capital markets. However, this group of people is not
generally recognized to be key to the popular argument just quoted. Indeed, in the
presence of such constrained households, young market-savvy workers, who according
to the popular argument should find privatization most appealing, will probably get
lower returns as a result of privatization.
We begin in Section I by defining what privatization means and by distinguishing
that concept from diversification and from prefunding. In Section II, we ask whether
projected returns on Social Security are in fact below those anticipated from U.S.
capital markets.3 Finally, in Section III we ask whether low Social Security returns are a
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While we focus on the rate of return concept of money’s worth in this paper, additional measures are
evaluated in more detail in our longer study (Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes, forthcoming).
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valid reason to support a privatization that does not involve prefunding. We conclude
that several valid rationales can be offered to support privatization, but taken by itself,
the low rate of return on Social Security is not among them.

I. What do we mean by Social Security privatization?
To begin, it is useful to draw a clear distinction between three terms that are
often confused: privatization versus diversification versus prefunding of Social
Security. By privatization we mean replacing the current mostly unfunded definedbenefit Social Security old-age program with a defined-contribution system of individual
accounts held in individual workers’ names. By diversification we mean investing
funds (either from the personal accounts or from the Social Security trust fund) into a
broad range of assets. These assets might include U.S. private sector stocks and
bonds, and foreign securities, in addition to the government bonds now used
exclusively by the Social Security trust fund. At the present time, the focus is on
diversifying into stocks. By prefunding we mean reducing the sum of the system’s
implicit and explicit debt (see Table 1).4
In the public debate these terms are often linked, but they are conceptually
different. It is easy to see why all three categories nevertheless appear together in the
public mind. Suppose the Social Security system had begun as a forced saving plan in
which all workers were obliged to set aside money for their retirement which would be
put into private accounts invested in a balanced portfolio of stocks and bonds. Then
4

There is debate over whether prefunding should refer to a change that reduces the total government
debt rather than just the social security debt. Here we assume that any changes in social security do not
change the non-social security debt or deficit.
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from the beginning the system would have been privatized, diversified, and completely
prefunded.
The situation is quite different now from what it was in 1935 when the United
States Social Security system began. Social security systems in the U.S. and in most
developed economies have amassed substantial unfunded liabilities; assets on hand
are insufficient to pay for the present value of benefits that have been accrued and
promised to workers and retirees based on contributions already made.5 In the U.S. for
instance, the unfunded present value of Social Security promises totals about $9
trillion.6 While this Social Security debt is implicit rather than explicit, it is economically
significant. The U.S. will surely not decide to eliminate this implicit debt by ignoring all
of the promised benefits.
Our tripartite decomposition is intended to emphasize that social security reform
could change any one of these three categories without changing the other two. For
example, the trust fund could invest in stocks as well as bonds, thus diversifying
without privatizing. Alternatively, workers could be given private accounts in which the
money was always invested in government bonds, thus privatizing without diversifying.
This is the case in Mexico’s new individual account system, where the government has
required that all pension assets be invested only in inflation-indexed bonds.7 It is also

5

The concept of unfunded liability is different from that of actuarial imbalance. Actuarial imbalance is
defined as the present value of expected benefits over some period (often 75 years) minus the present
value of expected tax receipts over the same period, minus the current value of the trust fund. The U.S.
currently has a 75 year actuarial imbalance of about 2.2 percent of payroll per year, or about 2.9 trillion
dollars in present value. See Goss (forthcoming).
6
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possible to raise system funding without involving individual accounts; taxes could be
raised or benefits cut and the proceeds could be put into a central trust fund.
Singapore’s national Provident Fund, for example, is a non-privatized, prefunded
system where the central government collects taxes sufficient to generate substantial
assets, which it then invests on the system’s behalf. Conversely, people could be
given individual accounts without prefunding of benefit promises. A privatized but
unfunded pension system has recently been established in Latvia, where payroll taxes
are collected by the government which then credits workers’ so-called “notional”
accounts with paper returns on contributions. Chile is the best-known example of a
country whose program is both prefunded and privatized: here workers hold assets in
individually-managed accounts, and debt under the old system is being reduced over
time.
Likewise in the United States, privatization without prefunding is quite possible;
a Social Security reform that created a national 401(k)-type system of private accounts
could be implemented with no change in Social Security debt. For example, the Social
Security system could issue new explicit debt (“recognition bonds”), guaranteed by the
federal government, with payouts set exactly equal to the benefit promises that have
accrued to date under the current system. These bonds would be given to current
participants in lieu of their accrued future benefit payments. All new contributions to
Social Security would then go directly into private individual accounts.8 If the
recognition bonds were paid off in full with new government tax receipts, the debt would

8

More gradual transitions to a system of individual accounts that leave (implicit plus explicit) debt
unchanged are also possible.
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eventually disappear when the last of today’s workers finally died. However, the Social
Security system could instead borrow again in the future by issuing new bonds to meet
the recognition bond coupon payments, and then again and again to meet the
payments on these new bonds. Subject to some limits, the government could choose
how much interest and principal to roll over and how much to pay off. If the government
were to choose to keep the path of explicit debt equal to the path of unfunded liabilities
under the current system (the implicit debt), the result would be a Social Security
system that was privatized without being prefunded.
In what follows we shall examine the claim that a privatized, diversified Social
Security system could deliver higher returns without any additional prefunding. We do
so in three steps. First, we analyze returns in a privatized system that confines
investments to government bonds. Next, we examine returns in a privatized and
diversified system in which investments in stocks are permitted. Finally, we analyze
returns in a privatized and diversified system and allow for the possibility that there are
some constrained households who do not currently have access on their own to
diversified capital markets.

II. Are projected rates of return on Social Security lower than those on U.S.
capital markets?
A starting point for projecting future returns on U.S. capital markets is to examine
historical returns. Table 2 reports the historical average of inflation-adjusted (i.e. real)
returns on stocks, bonds, and Treasury bills, as well as their variability. The average
annual real return on stocks (as proxied by the S&P 500) was 9.4 percent; the

6

corresponding return on intermediate term government bonds was 2.3 percent.9
Whether these provide reasonable forecasts for future years depends in part on one’s
judgment about whether the past will predict the future.
Cohort-specific rates of return under Social Security, from a study by Dean
Leimer, are presented in Figure 1.10 Historical data on current and past workers and
retirees, as well as projections of future contributions and benefits, are used to compute
rates of return, which we sometimes call by their more precise name, internal rates of
return (IRRs). We note first that prospective (internal) rates of return depend on a host
of predictions, including mortality, population growth, and real wage growth.11 Second,
the prospective IRR data are not those that would follow from forecasting taxes and
benefits under current Social Security rules, since that system faces insolvency or
actuarial imbalance. Instead the IRR figures for the future assume that taxes will be
increased sufficiently so that the system does not run out of money.12
9

These are arithmetic averages of annual returns from 1926 through 1996 taken from Ibbotson and
Associates (1998). The 1994-96 Advisory Council on Social Security projected that in the future stocks
would earn a 7 percent real return, as compared to 2 percent real return on bonds.
10

Leimer (1994).
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The internal rate of return (IRR) is defined as the interest rate that equates the present value of taxes
paid to the system and the present value of benefits received, by cohort. Two other “money’s worth”
measures sometimes reported are the present value ratio (PVB/PVT), or the present value of benefits
divided by the present value of taxes, and the net present value (NPV), or the present value of benefits
received minus the present value of taxes paid. The IRR and its companion money’s worth measures are
appealing because they seek to summarize in a single measure how a household might evaluate the
complex multi-year stream of Social Security payments and receipts. However the measure’s simplicity
belies the extensive assumptions and calculations needed to arrive at a single summary number. For
example, in order to conclude that workers born in 1930 anticipate a Social Security IRR of 4 percent it is
necessary to compute what that cohort paid in payroll taxes over all years of work (Leimer 1994). Not all
those born in 1930 have retired as yet, so future earnings profiles, taxes, and retirement patterns must
be forecasted. Each group’s tax payments must then be compared against the stream of Social Security
benefits actually paid out to people of that birth year. Of course, many 1930-cohort members are still
living, so future benefit payments and mortality patterns must again be estimated. For details see
Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (forthcoming).
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Leimer also provides estimates under the assumption that benefits are reduced to maintain solvency.
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Figure 1 shows that early cohorts under the program received very high IRRs in
real terms. Workers born in 1876 received a real return of over 35 percent per annum.
Workers born in 1900 received a 12 percent real return. The figure reveals that IRRs
fell over time for subsequent cohorts. Leimer estimated the return to be 5.7 percent for
those born in 1920, and about 2 percent for those born 1950-70. For workers born in
1975, he forecasted that IRRs would be around 1.8 percent, dropping down to 1.5
percent for those born in 1998.
Young or middle aged workers listening to the Social Security reform debate
today could reasonably ask how their anticipated IRR from Social Security would
compare with what could be earned by investing in U.S. capital markets. Leimer’s data
indicate IRR’s of about 1.5 percent for future cohorts; theoretical models of a pure payas-you-go social security system in steady state suggest that the IRR would be
expected to equal the growth of the wage base, which is currently forecasted to be
about 1.2 percent.13 Either way, it is clear that projected IRRs are well below expected
returns from investment in equities based on historical averages, and fall short of
average government bond returns in Table 2 as well. Thus, the popular rate of return
argument in favor of privatization seems to apply whether or not the investments are
diversified.
Why are projected Social Security returns low?
Projected Social Security returns are low, not because of waste or inefficiency,
but because the system developed as a primarily unfunded, pay-as-you-go system. In

13

For a discussion of the assumptions used to estimate future wage base growth rates as well as future
Social Security benefit and tax paths, see Advisory Council on Social Security (1997).
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a pure pay-as-you-go system, all contributions received by the system are paid out in
the same year as benefits to someone else, and no trust fund is accumulated. This
means that there are some early beneficiaries who receive benefits even though they
have not made any contributions. The U.S. Social Security system was not started as a
pure pay-as-you-go system, because only those individuals who contributed some
money to the system were eligible for benefits. Nevertheless, the accumulated trust
fund was minimal, so that it was still the case that the present value of benefits
received by those retiring soon after 1940 far exceeded the present value of
contributions they had made.
The key to understanding why IRRs must fall in our nearly pay-as-you-go Social
Security system is to exploit the connection between net present values (NPV) and
rates of return (IRR). Whenever the NPV for a cohort is positive, the IRR for the cohort
will be greater than the market rate, and vice-versa. Therefore, stating that early
generations received a positive net transfer from Social Security is equivalent to saying
that they received above-market rates of return on their contributions.14
In Figure 1, we saw that the real rates of return for early cohorts (birth-year
1876-1900) ranged from 12 to 37 percent.15 Figure 2 presents estimates of cohort net
present values, derived from Leimer’s study, corresponding to these cohort rates of

14

Comparing the present value of a cohort’s benefits and taxes is an application of the generational
accounting approach to measuring fiscal policy. See, for example, Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff
(1994).
15

Recall that these are real or inflation-adjusted returns -- nominal returns would obviously be even
higher.
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return.16 The dotted line (left scale) is the net present value, in 1997 dollars, of all
contributions and benefits for individuals born in the indicated year. As expected for
the beginning of a pay-as-you-go system, the present value of benefits exceeded taxes
for the first wave of retirees. Each birth-year cohort between 1880 and 1900 (those
retiring approximately 1945 -1965) received a lifetime transfer (in 1997 present value
dollars) of between 40 billion and 240 billion dollars. The solid line in figure 2 (right
scale) is the cumulative sum of all net transfers received by cohorts born prior to and
including the indicated birth year. Cohorts born through 1900 received a cumulative
net transfer of about 3 trillion dollars.
In part because the Social Security tax rates started out low in 1937 (the initial
tax rate was 2 percent) and gradually rose over time, the positive transfers to retirees
continued well past the first wave of beneficiaries. Those born between 1901 and 1917
received net transfers with present value of about $4.9 trillion. In addition, the 20 age
cohorts born between 1918 and 1937 are scheduled to receive a further net transfer of
$1.8 trillion, in present value. Adding up the $3 trillion, $4.9 trillion, and $1.8 trillion, we
arrive at an estimate of the total net transfer to the first 60 age cohorts of $9.7 trillion, or
roughly $10 trillion.
What do the positive net subsidies and high returns for early cohorts have to do
with the low returns forecasted for current and future cohorts? It can be shown that the
present value across all cohorts (from the beginning of the system forward for the

16

Leimer (1994) used the interest rates on trust fund assets (essentially intermediate-term U.S. Treasury
bonds) to convert current dollars into 1989 dollars. We convert the series into 1997 dollars using the
corresponding interest rates between 1989 and 1997.
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infinite future) of the net transfers received must sum to zero.17 Inevitably, cohorts born
after 1937 must give up in aggregate the whole $10 trillion, discounted back to 1997
dollars.18
In other words, since past cohorts received positive net transfers, some present
and future cohorts must receive negative net transfers. The connection described
above between net transfers and rates of return means that we can translate this
statement about net transfers into a statement about rates of return. Because past
cohorts received rates of return greater than market rates, current and/or future cohorts
must receive rates of return lower than market rates.19

17

To see this, first consider a system that is pay-as-you-go, so that in each year aggregate taxes are
equal to aggregate benefits, i.e., benefits minus taxes equals zero. Hence, the present value of each
year’s benefits minus taxes must equal zero, and therefore the sum across all years of these present
values must equal zero as well. So long as the present value of all benefits across all years and the
present value of all taxes across all years are each finite, which must necessarily hold if the interest rate
is on average higher than the rate of growth of the economy, we can rearrange and regroup benefits and
taxes however we like. Grouping together benefits and taxes for each birth cohort, we must have, as
claimed, that the present values of net transfers (benefits minus taxes), cohort by cohort, sum to zero.
This is also true with prefunding, and even with trust fund borrowing, provided that the trust fund
assets are invested at the same interest rate used to compute present values. In this case, the present
value of all benefits paid up to and including any year T is equal to the present value of all taxes up to
and including year T plus the present value of the year T trust fund. Allowing T to go to infinity and
assuming that the trust fund is not allowed to grow increasingly negative at rate r or faster and that the
government would not want it to grow increasingly positive at rate r or faster, the present value of net
transfers (benefits minus taxes) made to all birth cohorts must equal zero. See Geanakoplos, Mitchell,
and Zeldes (forthcoming) for more details.
The difference between a prefunded system and a pay-as-you-go system is that in the latter, the
early cohorts must get positive transfers, leaving negative transfers for later cohorts, whereas in a
prefunded system, the early cohorts may not get any positive transfers. Our current Social Security
system has very little prefunding. The correspondingly small trust fund indeed earns a bond rate of
return, so our analysis is relevant.
18

It is important to note that this discounting is at the real rate of interest. If, for example, the real rate of
interest is 2.3 percent per annum and inflation is 3 percent, and if the $10 trillion were paid back in one
lump sum in 30 years, then it would cost $48 trillion in 2027 dollars. The relentless power of
compounding interest is what makes the burden of the initial Social Security transfers many years ago
loom so large today.
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If the system had instead started as and remained a fully-funded system, then early participants would
have received market returns, i.e. zero net transfers, as would all current and future workers.
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How big the negative transfer must be for any one cohort born after 1937
depends on how the total transfer is spread across all the cohorts. Observe that
according to (our modifications of the numbers in) Leimer, the cohorts born between
1938 and 1977 are scheduled to receive negative transfers of about $2.5 trillion,
reducing the total projected net transfer to cohorts born before 1978 to approximately
$7.2 trillion. Of course much of this $2.5 trillion transfer has not yet occurred. The
young born in 1975, for example, have just begun to work, and so have not had time to
make any significant transfers through the Social Security system. Roughly half of the
working careers of cohorts born between 1938 and 1977 have passed by 1997. We
might guess therefore that subtracting the present value of Social Security taxes
already paid by cohorts born between 1938 and 1977 from the present value of Social
Security benefits already accrued as a result of these taxes gives about half of $2.5
trillion. That would mean that the sum of the net tax burden on all contributions made
after 1997 would equal $9.7 trillion minus $1.25 trillion, or about $8.5 trillion. In fact, the
number must be equal to the unfunded liability, which was calculated independently by
Stephen Goss at just under $9 trillion, thus providing a check on our numbers.20
There is a simple way of estimating the transfers that might be made each year
after 1997. Suppose the total negative transfer of $9 trillion is spread equitably among
all the cohorts, in the sense that every cohort is (or will be) asked to give up the same
percentage of its earnings each year of its working career. In a steadily growing
economy, the required annual transfer in year t would then be approximately equal to
(r-g)×(unfunded liabilities at end of year t-1), where r is the riskless real rate of return
20

Goss (forthcoming).
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and g is the growth rate of the economy (approximately equal to the sum of population
growth and technological improvement).21 Assuming that r is about 2.3 percent (as
indicated in table 2), and that g is about 1.2 percent, and using $9 trillion as the current
unfunded liability, transfers in 1997 must be on the order of $100 billion. Measured as
a percentage of Social Security taxes paid, which were about $400 billion in 1997, this
transfer represents about 25 percent of annual payroll taxes.22
Spreading the remaining start-up cost of our pay-as-you-go Social Security
system evenly over all cohorts requires each cohort to give up about 25 percent of
every annual contribution, or 3 percentage points of the current 12.4 percent payroll
tax. In other words, implicit interest payments explain why young workers may expect
only 75 percent of their taxes back in (the present value of) benefits over their
lifetimes.23 As long as the Social Security debt is spread out over all subsequent
cohorts, returns on Social Security will be lower for every cohort than returns paid by
bonds.

21

The transfer in period t+1 (TRANSt+1) is the amount by which contributions in period t+1 exceed the
present value of the benefits accrued as a result of those contributions. Define ULt as the unfunded
liability at time t. It can be shown (Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes, forthcoming) that the change in
the unfunded liability between t and t+1 ()ULt,t+1) is equal to (r × ULt) - TRANSt+1. In a steady-state
economy, the unfunded liability must grow at rate g, i.e., )ULt,t+1 = g × ULt. This implies that the transfer
must be exactly (r-g) × ULt, as claimed in the text.
22

This number is, of course, only an approximation. To get it we assumed that the real interest rate
would stay constant at 2.3 percent and that the wage base would grow steadily at rate 1.2 percent.
Among other things, both assumptions ignore demographic changes. In the current baby boom era, both
real interest rates and growth rates are higher than we assumed. If anything, however, it looks like actual
r-g is higher than we presumed, which would imply that the necessary transfers might be even more than
we suggest.
23

As a check, consider a hypothetical worker who pays level real Social Security taxes for 40 years and
receives level real benefits for the next 20 years at an internal rate of return of 1.2 percent (an estimate
of g). If instead, his contributions were reduced by 25 percent but his benefits remained the same, then
his internal rate of return would be 2.12 percent, which is close to our estimate of r of 2.3 percent.
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III. Are low Social Security returns a valid reason to support privatization?
The second step in the casual argument supporting privatization seems the
easiest and most straightforward -- so much so that it is often taken for granted. If
projected returns on Social Security are significantly lower than those offered in U.S.
capital markets, doesn’t it immediately follow that we would all be better off if we were
allowed to invest Social Security contributions directly in private securities? Frequent
arguments in the popular press and some studies by advocates of privatization suggest
that this is the case.24 Yet, this conclusion is misleading for two reasons: (1) It ignores
transition costs (i.e. how do we eliminate the implicit Social Security debt); and (2) It
does not account for changes in risk borne by participants. We take up each in turn.
Transition Costs
Let us begin by ignoring issues related to risk, such as diversification. Since the
rate of return on bonds is greater than the rate of return of Social Security, it would be
easy to increase the return for future cohorts by simply ignoring past contributions and
not paying any benefits accrued under the current system. The old Social Security
system could be shut down, and all new Social Security tax receipts could be put into
private accounts invested in bonds. Future cohorts would be able to earn market
returns. But then the entire $10 trillion cost of subsidizing the first 60 cohorts would in
effect be borne by the current middle-aged and old, who would then have paid into the
system for years and received little or nothing in return.

24

See, e.g., Forbes (1996) and Beach and Davis (1998). Also, there are sites on the World Wide Web
that calculate for users the benefit stream they will likely receive from Social Security and compare it to
the income stream attainable from investing their Social Security contributions in private capital markets.
See, for example, the CATO Institute web site at www.socialsecurity.org/calc/calculator.html.
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Alternatively, one could shut down the old system and privatize, but continue to
pay all the Social Security benefits accrued to date, based on past contributions. As
we noted earlier, recognition bonds could be issued to workers and retirees for the full
amount of the unfunded liability (i.e. $9 trillion). If the government did not default on
these bonds, new taxes would have to be raised to pay interest on the recognition
bonds. If, further, the new taxes were set to keep the path over time of recognition
bond debt the same as the path of implicit debt under the current system,25 then the
new taxes would correspond exactly to the transfers we mentioned in the last section.
In other words, it can be shown that the new taxes raised would eliminate all of the
higher returns on individual accounts.26 Let us see why.
Consider a steady-state economy growing at the constant rate g with market
interest rate r, and with a pay-as-you-go social security system begun sometime in the
distant past. As pointed out earlier, the implicit tax paid through social security in each
year is (r - g) × (the unfunded liability at the end of the previous year). If suddenly at
date t social security were privatized and transition costs were ignored (for example
because accrued benefits were never paid), the IRR on the privatized system in which
individual accounts were all held in marketed bonds would be equal to r. If instead
recognition bonds were issued, their market value at date t would have to be equal to
the unfunded liability in that year. In order to keep the debt growing at the same rate g
as the economy, taxes in the next year would have to be raised in the amount (r - g) ×

25

In a steady-state, the required path of debt would keep constant the ratio of outstanding recognition
bond debt to GDP.
26

For further discussion of this result, see Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (forthcoming).
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(unfunded liability). The extra taxes needed to finance the payments on the recognition
bonds would thus be identical to the transfers made each year in the old social security
system. By choosing the tax rates appropriately, the tax burden could be made to fall
exactly on the same people who were contributing more to social security than they
were receiving in benefits.27 Aside from the transfers, participants in the current payas-you-go Social Security system are in effect earning the bond rate of return on their
money. In a privatized system in which households invested their forced saving in
bonds, they would have to pay in new taxes exactly what they paid before in transfers.
In other words, the rate of return on a privatized system in which all private
investment is in marketed bonds, net of new taxes needed to pay the appropriate
interest on the recognition bond debt, would be identical to the low rate of return on the
current system. This is true regardless of how large the difference is between r and g -this difference could be 1.1 percent, 3 percent, 10 percent, or even higher!28 That is
why it is fallacious to assume that all future participants in a privatized Social Security
system could earn returns equal to those forecasted for U.S. capital markets. We thus
agree that returns to the current Social Security system are low, but we argue that there
is no costless way of improving them for all current and future workers.
Suppose, alternatively, that taxes were raised disproportionately on current

27

There are different ways of measuring accrued benefits, and each method would require a different tax
scheme to make taxes in a privatized system just equal to transfers in the current Social Security
system. We give one example. Suppose accrued benefits are defined on an equal present value basis,
that is suppose each dollar of contributions brings the same present value of accrued benefits
(discounted back to the point when the dollar is contributed). Suppose this ratio is .75. Then a
proportional tax of (1 - .75) × 12.4 percent = 3.1 percent would leave everyone exactly as well off in a
privatized system as he was in the current pay-as-you-go Social Security system.
28

Higher r makes privatized returns higher but, as we have just seen, it also increases the interest
burden of the unfunded liability.
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cohorts, and receipts were used to buy out some of the recognition bond debt, so that
the system reform increased the degree of funding.29 Then later cohorts would face
lower taxes to pay the interest on the remaining recognition bond debt. For these later
cohorts, returns on Social Security contributions, net of recognition bond taxes, would
be higher than under the current system. But for current workers, returns on a
privatized system would be lower than under the current system. Thus, transition costs
mean either that returns under a privatized system would be the same as the current
system (privatization with no prefunding), or that returns in the privatized system would
be lower than under the current system for some or all of the currently alive cohorts
and then higher for later cohorts (privatization with prefunding). The debate should be
focused on whether this is a tradeoff worth making,30 not on whether there is a free
lunch.
Risk Adjustment
Advocates of Social Security reform might be tempted to say that people would
invest their individual accounts in stocks -- earning a higher rate of return -- rather than
in bonds. By now readers should be suspicious of arguments that promise something
for nothing. After all, we just saw that although bonds earn a higher return than the
Social Security system, privatizing and investing in bonds would give no higher return
once the new taxes needed to redeem the outstanding liabilities of the current system
were properly accounted for.

29

A potential advantage of prefunding is that it would, according to most economists, increase national
saving. There is no reason to believe that privatization without prefunding would necessarily increase
national saving (see, e.g. Mitchell and Zeldes, 1996).
30

As argued, e.g. by Feldstein (1997).
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IRR computations usually overlook the fact that workers and retirees bear
different risks in a privatized versus a publicly run Social Security system. It is
important to keep in mind that when one asset is riskier than another, it should have a
higher equilibrium expected market return; this explains why stocks on average should
earn a higher return than bonds. As a result, safer returns from a conventional Social
Security system cannot be directly compared with riskier returns anticipated from an
equities-based system, unless risk-adjustment is done to make the programs
comparable. By risk adjustment, we mean adjusting downward the expected value of
risky returns (e.g., stock returns) to recognize the increased risk associated with these
securities.
Households that already hold both stocks and bonds in their portfolios and that
have the expertise to buy and sell stocks and bonds should value an additional dollar
of stocks the same as an additional dollar of bonds, even though stocks have a much
higher expected rate of return. If they valued an additional dollar’s worth of stocks
more than an additional dollar’s worth of bonds, they would have already sold some of
their bonds and bought stocks with the money.31 For this type of household, the riskadjusted rate of return on an additional dollar of stocks is identical to that on bonds.
Put differently, when considering a Social Security change that alters a small fraction of
such a household’s portfolio, it would be appropriate to compare the current Social
Security system to a privatized system in which the individual accounts were required

31

This is not to say that such a household would put its first dollar of saving into bonds instead of stocks,
but rather after its (perhaps considerable) investment in stocks, the next dollar of stock would increase
well-being no more than another dollar of bonds.
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to invest only in government bonds.32 And we have already seen in that case that
privatization does not bring higher returns, correctly measured.
For a larger change in Social Security investment policy, such households could
simply use their non-Social Security portfolio to completely offset the change in Social
Security. For example, imagine a middle-aged household paying $5,000 per year in
Social Security taxes (including employer contributions), which initially were being
placed directly into a personal account (run by the government) in the U.S. Treasury
bond market. Suppose the household was also saving outside of the Social Security
account an additional $10,000 per year, $9,000 in stocks and $1,000 in treasury bonds.
Overall, the household is putting 60 percent in stocks (9,000 out of 15,000), and 40
percent in bonds (6,000 out of 15,000). If the government suddenly switched the entire
Social Security account into stocks, this household could restore the 60-40 split of its
total saving by putting $4,000 into stocks and $6,000 into bonds out of its private
saving. In fact, no matter how the Social Security account is invested, this household
will be no better or worse off. The appropriate risk-adjusted return to such a household
from a Social Security account, no matter how it is invested, is the bond return. For a
household that is already diversified, the correctly measured return from a privatized
and diversified Social Security system is no higher than the current system.33

32

In practice, government bond returns are not equal to Social Security returns, and neither is riskless.
We ignore these issues here.
33

This argument holds even if there is an inexplicably large equity premium, as some economists claim
there is. Suppose the excess return on stocks above bonds is much more than can be justified by the
risk differential, because many households are irrationally underinvesting in equities. In that case, we
might be tempted on paternalistic grounds to force these irrational households to hold more stock.
However, this is no simple matter. If Social Security were simply privatized, these households would
likely choose not to hold any equities in their Social Security accounts for the same reasons they held too
few stocks in the rest of their portfolio. If households were instead forced into equities in Social Security,
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The real economic benefit to privatization comes from the attendant
diversification that would be made available to households that cannot participate on
their own in diversified capital markets. According to economic theory, every
household whose income is uncorrelated with stock returns should include some stock
in its portfolio in order to take advantage of the higher returns stocks provide compared
to bonds and other safe assets. The first dollars invested in stocks would definitely
raise risk-corrected returns, because they would bring extra returns without adding
much risk. Subsequent dollars invested in stock continue to raise returns, but at the
cost of more and more risk, eventually lowering risk-adjusted returns. How much
money should optimally be invested in stocks depends on the wealth and risk tolerance
of the household.
Households that are constrained in their private portfolio from holding sufficient
amounts of stock would be helped if a portion of their Social Security returns coincided
with equity returns. What type of households would fit into this category and how do
we recognize them? First, there are households that will not accumulate any wealth
outside of Social Security, but who would like to borrow money to invest in the stock
market if they could find a lender to loan them money at the bond rate.34 Second, there
are households that will invest 100 percent of their private wealth in the stock market,
and that would like to invest even more in the stock market if they could borrow at the
bond rate. Finally, there are households that will accumulate wealth outside of Social

they would likely undo this by reducing their holdings of equities in the rest of their portfolio.
34

Given the chance, these “liquidity constrained” households would prefer to use borrowing to increase
current consumption. If borrowing could be used only to purchase other assets, however, these
households would choose to borrow and purchase stocks.
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Security, but will choose not to invest in the stock market either because they are
uninformed about the relative returns and risks or because it is not worth it to them to
incur the fixed costs of becoming a stock market investor. Each of these groups would
benefit from owning individual accounts invested in the stock market.35 This provides
us with an economic rationale for privatization and diversification.36
There remains the issue of how many “constrained” households there are, that
do not have sufficient access to the stock market. The second group is probably small.
The first and third groups are a subset of the people who own no stocks. Fully 59
percent of the U.S. population (in 1995) did not hold stocks in any form.37 Some of the
non-stockholders, however, are young and have not yet accumulated much Social
Security or private wealth. What we really want to know is what fraction of the
population is unlikely to hold stock in the future, when they are accumulating Social
Security wealth. While we do not have direct estimates of this, about 50 percent of the
population aged 44-54 and 60 percent of those aged 55-64 held no stock in 1995. But

35

This assumes that the fixed costs would be lower under an individual account system.

36

This raises the issue of whether diversification into stocks is better achieved through privatized
individual accounts or through central trust fund investments. If constrained investors tend to be
irrational or myopic in their investment decisions, then it would be more advantageous for them if the
Social Security trust fund itself undertook stock investments on their behalf. Unconstrained investors
could still keep control of all their asset holdings (inside and outside of their Social Security funds) by
compensating in their private accounts for whatever the trust fund did that was not to their taste, as we
saw above. However, households such as those who have chosen optimally to hold small amounts of
stocks, perhaps because they are risk averse, may be forced to hold too much extra in stocks in their
Social Security accounts. These households would be made worse off. The more heterogenous are
constrained households in their tolerance of risk, and the wiser we think constrained households would be
in their investment choices, the more attractive is privatization as a means of achieving diversification.
The more homogeneous are constrained households in their tolerance of risk, and the more myopic we
think constrained households would be in their investment choices, the more attractive is trust fund
investment as a means of achieving diversification.
37

This is based on calculations using the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances. It includes stocks held
directly, through mutual funds, and through defined-contribution pensions. See Kennickell, StarrMcCluer, and Sunden (1997), and Ameriks and Zeldes (in progress).
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stockownership has risen in the past and is likely to continue to rise in the future, so
this is probably an upper bound on the fraction of the population that will not hold stock
in the absence of Social Security privatization and diversification. Also, not all those
without stock would benefit substantially by holding stocks. For some, their wage
income or private business income might be sufficiently positively correlated with the
stock market that they are better off not holding any equities. Others, who hold zero
stock because they are very risk averse and face a small fixed cost, would only see a
small benefit from increased holdings of stock in their social security account. Overall,
we would guess that significantly fewer than half of households would benefit
substantially (equivalently, experience substantially higher risk-adjusted returns) from
increased social security investment in stocks.
If there is a large number of constrained households, then Social Security
diversification would have macroeconomic consequences as well. The most important
general equilibrium effect of diversification would be an increase in the demand, and
thus in the price, of stocks and a corresponding decline in their expected return. As the
value of the stock market increased, current holders of stocks, which disproportionately
include the wealthy and older workers who have had time to accumulate stock, would
see their wealth increase. Young workers would find that they earned smaller returns
on their future stock purchases than they would have in the absence of diversification.38
While privatization and diversification may indeed bring benefits to some

38

Social security diversification would bring some indirect benefits to the economy, if there were many
constrained households. Unconstrained households would end up holding less stock, because some of it
would be in the hands of social security accounts held by constrained households who could not buy
stock previously. Thus unconstrained households would bear less risk. They would be inclined to shift
the mix of investment projects undertaken toward more risky ones. This might in turn raise future GDP.
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constrained households, and perhaps some indirect benefits to the economy as a
whole, the presence of these households is not part of the currently popular rate-ofreturn argument for privatization. According to that argument, all households, and
especially the youngest (“25 year-old workers”), are supposed to see higher returns
from privatizing Social Security. Yet when properly measured, rates of return for
unconstrained households will stay the same, or actually decline for young
unconstrained households.
Another risk consideration is that the government-run Social Security system
provides insurance functions that an individual-account system probably would not
provide, including insurance for shocks to earnings, length of life, disability, and
inflation. For instance, the benefit formula is structured to provide a higher rate of
return to low lifetime earner households than to high lifetime earner households. This
is justified on the grounds that a social insurance plan can pool over the entire
population certain risks that are difficult to insure privately, particularly disability,
unemployment, and poverty. To the extent that private equivalents for these forms of
social insurance would be more costly or non-existent, privatizing the program would
increase participants’ risk exposure. Consequently, to the extent that social insurance
affords benefits that private insurance could not, this raises the risk-adjusted return on
a government-run Social Security system.
There is another risk factor that must be accounted for as well. A publicly run
defined-benefit program incurs political risk. This occurs because current workers
cannot effectively contract with and bind as-yet-unborn cohorts of taxpayers to pay for
them when they grow old. As a result, Baby Boomers feel unsure that they will wield the
23

political clout to extract rising payroll taxes from their children and grandchildren, to
support them when they are old. This is a risk that cannot be traded, so there is no way
for those more willing to bear this risk to trade with those less willing to bear it. While the
simple models described above do not have a good way to price this type of risk,
correcting for political risk would probably work in the direction of increasing the riskadjusted returns and relative attractiveness of a privatized system.

IV. Conclusion
In this paper we argue that privatization, diversification, and prefunding are
distinct and should be considered as such. We also argue that it is worthwhile
separating a move toward system privatization into three steps. Suppose that individual
accounts are created, but that all benefits accrued to date from past Social Security
contributions are honored, and that the funding level of the system is held constant
(because new explicit debt is issued to cover the unfunded liability of the present Social
Security system). In the first step, consider a world with no uncertainty in which
individuals are only allowed to invest the individual accounts in government bonds.
Although the market return on bonds is greater than that projected on Social Security,
once transition costs (to pay interest on the new debt) are accounted for, the rate of
return on the two systems would be identical. We estimate that paying for the transition
costs would require about a 25 percent tax on all payments into new accounts. This
surtax would wipe out all of the extra returns attainable by holding bonds in people’s
individual accounts. Our 25 percent number depends on forecasts of future growth
rates g of the economy, and future real interest rates r. If those forecasts of r and g
24

were to change, the tax would have to change. But the result that all of the gains to
privatization would disappear in extra taxes to pay off the unfunded liability is true
regardless of the specific values of r and g.
Next, consider adding idiosyncratic risk (e.g. shocks to earnings and length of
life). If the privatized system contains no special insurance provisions and the private
market is unable to provide these, then the risk-adjusted rate of return under
privatization would be lower than under the current system.
Thirdly, consider adding aggregate risk and allowing households to invest their
individual accounts in equities. For households that already held both stocks and bonds
elsewhere, and were thus unconstrained in their portfolio choice, the risk-adjusted rate
of return would be no higher than the risk-adjusted rate of return if the individual
accounts were held entirely in bonds. For the others, namely those who do not currently
have as much invested in equities as they might like, the risk-adjusted rate of return on
a portfolio with equities would be higher as a result of diversification into stocks, thus
providing an important rationale for diversification. Nevertheless, this return would not
be as much higher as a naive comparison of expected returns would suggest. If this
group is large, there will also be general equilibrium effects that will likely lower the
expected return on stocks, thus making worse off young households who would have
invested in stocks anyway.
Finally, what if the system’s funding were increased at the same time as
individual accounts were created? While the increase in funding would likely raise the
rate of return on Social Security for future generations (and raise national saving in the
process), it must be kept in mind that it would do so only at the cost of lower returns to
25

current cohorts.
We argue that the Social Security reform debate should focus on (1) the tradeoff
between returns for current cohorts versus future cohorts, (2) the risk bearing benefits to
the economy of enlarging the population that holds a diversified portfolio to include
constrained households, and (3) whether diversification is better implemented via
privatized personal accounts or through trust fund investments.
We recognize that privatization has several other important benefits, including
increased portfolio choice, reduced political risk, possibly reduced labor supply
distortions, and an intangible increased sense of ownership and responsibility. It is also
possible that privatization may improve the political feasibility of implementing
prefunding and/or diversification, thus increasing the chance of achieving the benefits to
future generations and constrained households described earlier. Indeed some find
these overwhelming reasons to favor privatization. These positives, however, must be
balanced against the loss of social risk pooling mentioned above, somewhat higher
administrative costs,39 and perhaps the social and personal costs of permitting workers
to make “unwise” portfolio choices. In any event, our main message is that the popular
argument that Social Security privatization would provide higher returns for all current
and future workers is misleading, because it ignores transition costs and differences
across programs in the allocation of aggregate and household risk.

39

See Mitchell (1998), for an analysis of administrative costs.
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Table 1: Differentiating Privatization, Prefunding, and Diversification
of Social Security
• Privatization: Replace existing social security system with a system of individual accounts
held and managed by individuals.
• Prefunding: Raise contributions and/or cut benefits so as to lower the sum of explicit and
implicit debt associated with the system.
• Diversification: Invest social security funds into a broad range of assets, including equities.

Privatization
NO
• Current system

YES
• Create individual accounts
• Issue recognition bonds
• Perpetually roll over principal and enough
interest to keep path of debt same as that
of unfunded liability under current system

NO
Diversification
No: Current system

Prefunding

Yes: Borrow, invest
proceeds in equities
through trust fund

• Raise taxes / cut benefits
to decrease unfunded
liability

Diversification
No: Require individual accounts to
hold bonds
Yes: Permit individual accounts to
hold equities and bonds

• Create individual accounts
• Issue recognition bonds
• Raise taxes / cut benefits to make path of
debt lower than path of unfunded liability
under current system

YES
Diversification
No: Invest trust fund in
bonds

Diversification
No: Require individual accounts to
hold bonds

Yes: Invest trust fund
in equities

Yes: Permit individual accounts to
hold equities and bonds

Privatization, prefunding, and diversification are distinct concepts.
It is possible to have any one, without either of the other two.

Table 2: Annual Inflation-Adjusted Returns on
Stocks and Government Bonds: 1926-1996

Asset

Arithmetic
average
return (%)

Standard
deviation (%)

Real S&P 500

9.4

20.4

Real long-term government bond

2.4

10.5

Real intermediate-term
government bond

2.3

7.1

Real short-term T-bill

0.7

4.2

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Ibbotson & Associates (1998).

Figure 1:
Estimated Real Internal Rates of Return
on Social Security Contributions
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